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, 1925, a coup d’état overthrew the Ecuadorian government of the president Gonzalo S. 
Córdova. The Military Junta chose the new president, Dr. Isidro Ayora, who founded the Central Bank 
of Ecuador in 1927. The majority of historians emphasize the patriotic spirit of the military forces in 
order to eliminate the influence of private banks. Nonetheless, there is a less popular view of the 
process known as the Julian Revolution, which understands the coup d’état, and the foundation of the 
Central Bank of Ecuador, as the result of struggles between bankers due to controversies around 
currency emissions. 
The arguments behind the Julian Revolution were based on some economic facts. Even though real 
GDP did not decrease in any year from 1913 to 1927, there was a generalized perception of a critical 
economy due to the constant fluctuation in prices, the increasing of fiscal deficit, and the reduction of 
revenues from the trade balance. This article proposes two hypotheses: first, the economic crisis was 
not an isolated case in Latin America, on the contrary, it was part of a regional trend; second, the 
economic crisis only affected the urban areas, which account for less than half of the total population. 
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, 1925, a coup d’état overthrew the Ecuadorian government of the president 
Gonzalo S. Córdova, which was replaced by a Supreme Military Junta. After a year, the 
Supreme Military Junta chose the new president, Dr. Isidro Ayora, who ruled until 1931 and 
who founded the Central Bank of Ecuador, after the recommendation of the Kemmerer 
Mission. The Central Bank of Ecuador was the key point around which a new financial 
structure was established. The main objective of this new financial structure was the fiscal 
stability using one specific tool: the golden standard.  
Some historians have analyzed profoundly this event in the Ecuadorian history, known as the 
Revolución Juliana
1
, through two perspectives. The first, the patriotic spirit of the military 
forces that was needed to close a period in which private banks had the control of the political 
power and, in turn, returned the power to the people. This perspective emphasizes the 
economic critical situation in Ecuador as the causes of a political and social instability. The 
second, a less popular view, which understands the coup d’état, and the foundation of the 
Central Bank of Ecuador, as the result of the struggles between bankers due to the 
controversies around currency emissions. This point of view underlines the strong influence 
of Luis Napoleón Dillon, a private banker from Quito, in the military forces that organized the 
coup d’état.   
This paper has three main objectives. First, to review the arguments behind the two main 
readings of the Revolución Juliana, are they complementary or are they opposed to each 
other? Was Ecuador living an economic crisis that justified the arguments behind the 
revolution? Was Ecuadorian economy an isolated case or was part of a trend in the region? 
                                                          
1
 The Revolución Juliana comes from the month in which the coup d’état took place.     
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Second, to build a historical context to understand the coup d’état, the creation of the Central 
Bank of Ecuador and the influence of the Kemmerer Mission in the construction of the new 
financial system. Third, to build a comprehensive economic background of the country, using 
the main macroeconomic statistics available from 1913 to 1927.  
Reconstructing the historical versions of the Revolución Juliana 
On July 9
th
, 1925, a coup d’état finished the Ecuadorian President Gonzalo S. Córdova, who 
had been elected the previous year. President Córdova was replaced by a Military League that 
was formed in October of 1924, “when a reduced group of young officials, in the heat of the 
conversations around the adversities in Ecuador, and the need to do something serious, 
decided, finally, to confabulate to save the country” (Paz y Miño Cepeda 2002, 15). 
According to Paz y Miño (2002, 13), the Revolution had a patriotic idealism that drove the 
officials to finish the presidential period of Córdova: “in Ecuador, the military coup d’état of 
the 9
th
 of July, 1925, known as the Revolución Juliana, came to happen because of the 
collapse of the Liberal State.”   
The Military League would organize a Supreme Military Junta, which, in turn, would 
establish a Provisional Government Junta that should govern the nation through a group of 
people of provable honorability. There were two Provisional Government Juntas: the first 
operated from July 20
th
, 1925 to January 9
th
, 1926; the second did from January 10
th
, 1926 to 
March 31
st
, 1926. On April 1
st
, 1926, Isidro Ayora Cueva was chosen as the President of the 
Republic of Ecuador, his term lasted until August 24
th
, 1931, when he was resigned. Dr. Isidro 
Ayora Cueva founded the Central Bank of Ecuador after the recommendations of Edwin W. 
Kemmerer who headed the Kemmerer Mission. The Central Bank of Ecuador was the key 
 
Volume 2, Number 1, 128-173, January-June 2017                  doi: 10.1344/jesb2017.1.j025  
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
131 
point around which a new financial structure was established, having as the main objectives to 
achieve the fiscal stability and the bank system modernization. 
Historians, who, in majority, share a common point of view, have analyzed the Revolución 
Juliana under the scope of a patriotic spirit inside the military forces. This patriotism was 
needed to close a period when private banks had the control of the political power. This point 
of view is built around the idea that the military forces wanted to return the power to the 
people. Nonetheless, there is a less popular view of this event, the one that understands the 
coup d’état, and the foundation of the Central Bank of Ecuador, as the result of struggles 
between bankers due to controversies around currency emissions.          
The first point of view, the most popular one, underlines some kind of patriotic efforts of the 
military forces that tried to change the Liberal State instated since 1895, the hegemony of the 
banks from Guayaquil (the main costal city), and the discrimination of the workers. The 
military forces were concerned about the economic situation installed in Ecuador produced by 
the main banks: Banco del Ecuador, Banco Comercial y Agrícola, Banco del Pichincha, 
Banco del Azuay, Banco de Descuento, Compañía de Crédito Agrícola e Industrial. 
The ideas of the revolution were “born on October 25
th
, 1924, when a small group of young 
officers in the heat of the talks on the misfortunes of Ecuador and the need to do something 
serious, finally decided to conspiring to save the country” (Paz y Miño Cepeda 2002, 15). In 
May 1925, the President, Gonzalo Córdova, who was in Guayaquil to get treated of some 
medical problems, received a telegram from his Minister of Interior, Jaramillo Alvarado, who 
stated, “[…] real data provides the convincing fact that in May the revolution will explode[...] 
You are the referee and the head responsible for this moment in history. Save the country, Mr. 
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President, from a civil war” (El Día 1925, 26
th
 of July). On the 9
th
 of July 1925, a small group 
of military, the majority were young officials, overthrew the government.   
Pérez Ramírez (2014) provides a tribute to the young official who made the decision of 
saving the country: they “decided to do something for the homeland imbued with patriotic 
ideals” (2014, 13). Pérez stands out the biographies of eight of the young officials, the only 
ones who singed the foundation of the Military League: Agustín Patiño Donoso, Virgilio 
Guerrero Espinosa, José Morán Estrada, Carlos Abarca Montesinos, José Antonio Guerrero 
Hidalgo, Luis A. Rodríguez Sandoval, Samuel Jarrín Polanco, Manuel Martín Ycaza 
Valverde.      
Paz y Miño (2002, 12) affirms that the young officials had their internal motivations which 
underlined the need to ensure a professional career, a better welfare system, with 
improvements in remuneration, courses and scholarships. On the 10th of July, 1925, one day 
after the coup d’état, the main newspaper of Guayaquil, published that “[…] the Army of the 
Republic, convinced that the sacred interests of the country could not continue under the 
mercy of a regime, that was in absolute divorce with the national will, made the right decision 
to topple the government” (El Telégrafo 1925, 10
th
 of July) of Gonzalo S. Córdova, elected in 
1924. 
The revolution had a banker within their supporters: Luis Napoleón Dillon. Before the coup 
d’état, Dillon “tried to get followers inside the Army to take out of the Cordova´s 
government” (Pérez Ramírez 2014, 46). Dillon was a businessman from Quito who founded a 
bank called Sociedad de Crédito Internacional in 1922, whose main purpose was to issue 
currency in the highlands. Dillon was convinced that the coastal financial power established 
in Guayaquil was dominating the country, “Dillon became the leading and most visible 
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northern highland critic of the coast” (Rodríguez 1994, 48). Dillon was part of the first 
Provisional Government Junta
2
, and worked as Minister of Finance until January 1926. 
During the second Provisional Government Junta, Dillon was a member of the first board of 
the Central Bank of Ecuador.  
The participation of Dillon in the Revolución Juliana, his decisions as Minister of Finance, his 
participation in the Provisional Government Junta, and his presence in the first board of the 
Central Bank of Ecuador, write a less common known version of the revolution: Dillon 
becomes the cornerstone of the controversy in this part of the paper. His support to the 
revolution may not have been in favor of the patriotic spirit that flowed in the air of the young 
military officials, his participation in the revolution may have had other intentions, which will 
be explained with the second point of view of the Revolución Juliana.  
The second point of view about the Revolución Juliana is less known, and probably less 
accepted by the historians in Ecuador. This perspective emphasizes the personal intentions of 
Dillon during his participation in the revolution. Guillermo Arosemena (2002) believes that 
the revolution was financed and supported by a private banker, Luis Napoleon Dillon. 
According to the narrative of Arosemena, Dillon was a well-educated person, who was 
obsessed by the rivalry between the Coast (Guayaquil) and Highlands (Quito).  
Dillon was the manager of a local bank in Quito, Sociedad de Crédito Internacional. This 
credit society was used to fund Dillon’s textile company called Fábrica de Tejidos de la 
Sociedad de Crédito Internacional. In fact, when reviewing the researches of the historians 
that support the first point of view, there is no mention of its function as a national credit 
                                                          
2
 The members of the First Provisional Junta were: Luis Napoleón Dillon, José Rafael Bustamante, Francisco J. 
Boloña, Francisco Arízaga Luque, Pedro Pablo Garaicoa, Modesto Larrea Jijón, and General Francisco Gómez 
de la Torre.   
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institution, the only thing said about it is that: “the Sociedad de Crédito Internacional, in 
1921, as a credit institution from Quito, became the banking institution that helped to 
established the electric municipal power plant in Quito” (Pérez Ramírez 2014, 198).     
Before 1925, private banks had the authorization of issuing currency because there was no 
public institution that could monopolize the monetary emissions. Some banks from Guayaquil 
became very powerful for three reasons: the governmental needs for loans to cover the fiscal 
deficits; the ability of issuing currency; and, the commercial movement of the city, the biggest 
companies, by 1900, had their headquaters in Guayaquil, with  
a capital between 1 and 5 million sucres, while in Quito, the most important was of only 
200,000. The companies from Guayaquil were 10 times larger than in the capital. It could not 
be otherwise because 95% of exports came from the coastal provinces and about 90% of the 
total bank deposits. The difference in living standards between Quito and Guayaquil was 
abysmal in favor of the latter causing resentment among citizens in Quito (Arosemena 2002, 
18)  
The issuing of currency produced an inflationary trend, which was directly related to the 
behavior of private banks. The price index, compiled by Linda Alexander Rodríguez (1992, 
207) shows, from 1921 to 1925, an annual averaged inflation of 24%. Nonetheless, 
Arosemena (2002) points out that, contrary to the opinion that the coastal private banks 
manipulated the government through the covering of its fiscal needs, “they were victims of 
the Ecuadorian system and abuse of the power of governments. In the past century, banks 
from Quito, as Banco Union and Banco de Quito, also made the same mistake of addressing 
the needs of the State budget, they broke a few years from being founded” (Arosemena 2002, 
104).  
By 1924, Luis Napoleón Dillon was the president of the Chamber of Commerce in Quito, and 
he was the manager of Sociedad de Crédito Internaciona. He accused the private banks from 
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Guayaquil as the institutions responsible for the critical economic situation of the nation, and 
made constant public speeches asking for changes. When the Military Junta took control of 
the government, in July 9
th
, they immediately created the Junta of Government with seven 
people who would manage the new government. The members of the Junta of Government 
were: Luis Napoleón Dillon, General Gómez de la Torre, General Moisés Oliva, José Rafael 
Bustamante, Francisco Arízaga Luque, and, from the Coast, Francisco Boloña y Pedro Pablo 
Garaicoa.    
Rodríguez (1994, 47) shares the view that Dillon not only had the northern highland’s 
antipathy toward the Coast, “but his hostility was also fueled by the belief that his financial 
and political ambitions had been thwarted by Guayaquil bankers, particularly Urvina Jado.” 
Rodríguez explains that Dillon founded the Sociedad de Crédito Internacional to issue 
currency in the Highlands, yet, the government blocked his intentions. Urvina Jado, president 
of the coastal Banco Comercial y Agrícola had informed the Minister of Finance, Alfonso 
Larrea, of Dillon’s intentions. The government prohibited the circulation of currency from 
Sociedad de Crédito Internacional. 
Rodríguez (1994) pointed out that Urvina Jado behaved in the same way with a bank from 
Guayaquil, Banco de Descuento, when its managers tried to circulate bills. Urvina protested 
to the Minister Larrea who immediately prohibited the bank to circulate new bills. In both 
instances. Linda Rodríguez considers that Urvina Jado acted to protect the nation’s currency. 
President Córdova offered Dillon another portfolio, which was rejected; Dillon believed that 
“he deserved to be minister of finance since he was the manager of La Internacional, the 
country’s largest textile factory, and because he was one of the most influential members of 
the highland business community” (Rodríguez 1994, 48).  
 
Volume 2, Number 1, 128-173, January-June 2017                  doi: 10.1344/jesb2017.1.j025  
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
136 
Why did the government listen so attentively to Urvina Jado? Rodríguez (1994) thinks that 
the reason was because the government owed much money to the Banco Comercial y 
Agrícola. In this sense, the idea that flowed in the environment of the highlanders that the 
coastal bankers had the control of the government and, therefore, the political power, 
strengthened around the most influential people in Quito: businessmen, military officials, 
politicians, and some tabloids. La Antorcha (1924) and El Abanderado (1924), newspapers 
from Quito, published a series of articles that tried to prove, with the use of evidence that 
never was published, that Banco Comercial y Agrícola was forcing the government to sell the 
Galapagos Islands. The situation infuriated the young military officials that finally decided to 
overthrow the government of President Córdova.            
Victor Emilio Estrada, cited by Arosemena (2002), in a public letter, in 1934, provided of 
new information to understand the Revolución Juliana. When he was the head of Treasury, he 
found documents pointing the fact that Dillon had wanted to circulate currency issued by his 
Sociedad de Crédito Internacional. When Mr. Urbina, the President of Banco Comercial y 
Agrícola, “knew this inflationary project he informed the government, which prevented Mr. 
Dillon to circulate currency […] From the moment Dillon realized that Mr. Urbina and Banco 
Comercial y Agrícola opposed these emissions […] he became a sworn enemy of Banco 
Comercial y Agrícola and its manager, and quickly prepared the revolution which trashed the 
bank and led its manager to the tomb” (Arosemena 2002, 132).  
Estrada’s statement places the revolution under a controversial scope: the young officials 
were encouraged and financed by a banker who tried to get vengeance for the limitations he 
found when he tried to issue currency from his own bank.  The revolution was not the 
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“product of inflation or devaluation of the sucre, but of vengeance from the person who 
wanted to circulate fake currency and got prohibited” (Arosemena 2002, 102).      
The researchers that see some value in this point of view consider that the difference between 
the two perspectives of the revolution comes from a regional fact: the majority of historians 
are from the Highlands (Rodríguez 1992). In the same path of thought, it seems clear that the 
main objective of the revolution was to move the economic and political power to Quito, and, 
in order to establish the headquarters of this renowned power, the Central Bank of Ecuador 
was founded. The military and people who supported the revolution were “determined to end 
the financial power of the coastal elite, leaders from the Highlands tried to establish the 
Central Bank in Quito and destroy the Banco Comercial y Agrícola, the largest and most 
prominent bank in Guayaquil” (Rodríguez 1992, 156). 
The first Junta of Government formed commissions to investigate the behavior of some 
banks, the main one, Banco Comercial y Agrícola. The results were presented to the new 
Minister of Finances, Luis N. Dillon, on the 22
nd
 of August 1925, in a report that “came to the 
conclusion that the bank had illegally circulated currency” (Rodríguez 1992, 157). This 
conclusion was based on questionable interpretations of what meant to have a legal reserve to 
back up the emission of currency. Shortly after, Dillon recommended the closure of the bank, 
after imposing a fine of 2,237,093.33 sucres. As the bank had offices in many cities of the 
country, Dillon also recommended the replacement of Banco Comercial y Agrícola with the 
foundation of the Central Bank of Ecuador. 
The stories behind the Revolución Juliana and behind the foundation of the Central Bank of 
Ecuador build some new insights that help to see a clearer picture of this event. To be able to 
read this event through the first point of view, the Hegelian reading of history (Hegel 2001), 
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in which contradictory forces create a new path to understand history, is helpful: the critical 
economic situation, the regional belief that the Coast manipulated the government decisions, 
and the idealism of the military forces crashed into one result, the creation of the Central 
Bank of Ecuador.  
To understand the second point of view, it is necessary to frame the reading inside the 
Foucauldian understanding of how power writes history, “Foucault is an antihistorical 
historian, one who, in writing history, threatens every canon of the craft” (Poster 1982, 116). 
This Foucauldian framework is helpful to see that this way of telling the story behind the 
foundation of the Central Bank of Ecuador threatens the traditional understanding of History 
in Ecuador because the new elements, that were not told before, break the core vision and the 
common agreement of how to see the Revolución Juliana. This reading proposes a new 
conclusion: the foundation of the Central Bank of Ecuador was a product of a regional dispute 
on the economic and political power of the country, with the help of some military officers, 
the power was founded, or re founded, in Quito.  
To be able to propose a comprehensive understanding of the events, some facts have to be 
taken into account:  
First: the military officials that organized the coup d’état were young which shows a common 
idealism to feel entitled of the transformation of the nation. 
Second: there is no doubt that there was the idea of a regional conflict between the Coast and 
the Highlands, which was reinforced when the banks from the Coast influenced the 
governmental decisions. 
Third: the most influential civilian in the revolution was Luis Napoleón Dillon, this fact is 
clear to accept considering that Dillon was elected to be part of the First Provisional 
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Government Junta, as a Minister of Finance, and, after that, he was part of the first board of 
the Central Bank of Ecuador. 
Fourth: Banco Comercial y Agrícola was closed, and its reserves were used to fund the Caja 
Central de Emisión y Amortización that became, after a few months, the Central Bank of 
Ecuador.  
These facts build a more complete reading of the Revolución Juliana. The banks from the 
Coast had an enormous influence in the decisions of the government; this fact reinforced the 
regional dispute of power between the Coast and the Highlands. The young military officers 
probably had genuine motives that put them into the position to believe that they were in 
charge of turning around the economic situation of the nation. The role of the military officers 
was largely inflated by the most influential civilian in the Highlands, Luis Napoleón Dillon, 
whose motives had not only a “patriotic” feeling but, mainly, a revenge feeling which caused 
his involvement in the Revolution, his participation in the first Junta of Government and in 
the first board of the Central Bank of Ecuador. There is no certainty that Dillon financed the 
revolution, but this idea would fit the story with no contradiction. Dillon represents the 
regional struggles between the Coast and the Highlands, the combination of his influence and 
the military intervention produced a remarkable output: the political and economic power 
returned to Quito, this was acquired by closing the most influential bank from Guayaquil and 
by founding the Central Bank of Ecuador in Quito.  
Nonetheless, there are still some arguments that have not yet been valued: the economic 
arguments used to justify the revolution. The “critical economic situation” that Ecuador was 
living before the revolution is supported by a simple fact, the increasing cost of living. After 
presenting the influence of the Kemmerer Mission in the region, the economic arguments that 
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justify the abrupt closing of the Presidency of Córdova will be analyzed in the following 
epigraphs.  
The United States influence and the Kemmerer Mission in Latin America 
After 1919, the period of the postwar brought two important changes to the Latin American 
region: first, the increasing U.S. influence through foreign investment; second, the return to 
the gold standard. During the years that preceded the foundation of the central banks in Latin 
America, after the Great War, United States stretched its influence by increasing the 
investment, a hand to development that the region could not deny to hold.  
The increasing American influence in commerce and politics was the result of the European 
weakness and destruction caused in the Great War. From 1913 to 1929, United States pushed 
away the British presence in the hemisphere,  
in 1913 Britain had estimated $532 million invested in the five Andean republics, while the 
United States had a mere $72 million. Sixteen years later, England’s investment had increased 
by only 14 percent, while those of the United States had risen- according to enthusiasm- by 
over 1200 percent (Drake 1995, 11) 
In the Latin-American countries, the American foreign investment went from an averaged 87 
million per country in 1919 to 154.3 million of current dollars (Naranjo 2016). In the same 
study, we affirmed that, in the Andean countries, the American investment moved from the 
agricultural sector, during the XIX century, to the oil sector, during the first decades of the 
XX Century: “in Venezuela, the investment in the oil sector reached a 5 per 100 of annual 
growing… the investment in the oil sector was important for the Venezuelan exports 
development during the twenties, as well as for the Peruvian and Colombian” (Naranjo 2016, 
82).  
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In Argentina the agriculture was the main focus of the external investment, the agricultural 
and livestock production Index went from 29, in 1900, to 117 in 1929. In other countries, such 
as Panama, Guatemala and Cuba, the General Electric had the control of the electricity 
production. Finally, the investment in railroads was top in Mexico and Ecuador: in the case of 
Mexico, the proximity between United States and the coal and iron ore regions in Mexico 
helped enhance these investments; in the case of Ecuador, the political decisions of the 
presidents Gabriel García Moreno and General Eloy Alfaro enhanced the American 
investment in railways. The investment came to the country also as credits, “in the 1920s, 
there was a boom of foreign private loans from the United States. Sellers managed to put 
loans to unwary governments” (Thorp 1992, 53), encouraging them to borrow beyond their 
possibilities.  
Figure 1 shows the American investment in some countries in Latin America. From 1919 to 
1929, the amount invested raises considerably in all countries, except in Colombia and Peru. 
The most impressive case was Argentina, where the American investment grew from 0.3 to 
28.1 million-dollars/per capita. The American influence in the region increased through the 
multiplications of investors that reach the needing countries, these investors were dressed 
with the image of American banks: in 1926, there were 61 branches of US banks in Latin 
America (Phelps 1927). Table 1 shows the commercial relationship between the United States 
and the countries of Latin America: from 1913 to 1927, the relationship of commerce 
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Figure 1. American foreign investment/per capita in Latin America, 1919, 1924, 1929. 
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Table 1. Commerce between the United States and Latin America, percentage of the total Latin 
American commerce, 1913, 1918, 1927 
 1913 1918 1927 
South America        
     Imports from the U.S.  16.2 25.9 26.8 
     Exports to the U.S.  16.8  34.8  25.2  
Mexico, Central America, Caribe     
     Imports from the U.S. 53.2 75.0 62.9 
     Exports to the U.S. 71.3 73.4 58.4 
Source: Thorp 1992, 53 
The return to the gold standard came along with the creation of central banks in the region. 
This was the product of the influence of the Kemmerer Mission. Edwin Walter Kemmerer 
was born in Scranton, Pennsylvania, the 29
th
 June 1875. His father, Lorenzo Dow Kemmerer, 
had a German ancestry. E.W. Kemmerer attended Wesleyan in Middletown, Connecticut; 
after obtaining his bachelor, he was accepted for graduate studies on economics at Cornell 
University. In 1903, Kemmerer obtained a Ph.D. in Economics and Finances; in the same 
year, he started working as financial advisor to the US-Philippines Commission. Kemmerer 
helped to establish certain type of measures to support the gold standard in the Philippines. 
After this, Kemmerer helped, playing a small role, setting up the Federal Reserve System.  
Before becoming the “Money Doctor”, E. W. Kemmerer worked at Princeton University 
teaching Money and Banking, and International Finance. During his time at Princeton, his 
career developed greatly, his main contribution was the book “Modern Currency Reforms” 
published in 1916, where he cultivated the idea that “adopting a gold standard was the wisest 
course of action for a nation enjoyed well night universal respect” (Kemmerer 1993, 22). 
Many nations around the world agree with Kemmerer statements, in fact, by 1930, more than 
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40 nations had returned to the gold standard, a system that would prevent the causes of 
inflation.  
In 1917, Kemmerer worked as advisor in Mexico helping to solve the central-banking 
problems, and in 1919 in Guatemala. In 1918, his book, “The ABC of the Federal Reserve 
System” (Kemmerer 1922) was published, and through it, his fame as an expert on Central 
Banks and Federal Reserves was spread around many countries. After visiting Mexico and 
Guatemala, Kemmerer was hired as financial advisor in Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia 
and Peru, “during his teaching career, Edwin Kemmerer, a professor of economics at 
Princeton, was called upon to advise the governments of fourteen nations on their monetary 
standards and policies of fiscal reform and modernization” (Kemmerer 1993, 9). 
The advice and policies of the Kemmerer Mission had similar patterns in each country they 
visited. The common elements in all the countries were: the creation of central banks, 
Superintendence of Banks, General Comptroller; and the proposal of a series of laws by 
which the government would settle the gold standard as public monetary policy. These 
changes in the region did not come out of domestic matters; “it is unlikely that one country’s 
local problems explain its creation of a central bank when all its neighbors were establishing 
exactly the same institution at precisely the same time” (Drake 1995, 2). The creation of 
central banks came along with the creation of some public institutions that will structure the 
functioning of the gold standard. From 1919 to 1930, these structural changes occurred in the 
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Table 2. Founded institution and approved laws: the results of the Kemmerer Mission in Latin 
America 
Country Founded institutions Approved laws 
Guatemala 
(1919) 
 Banco Central de Guatemala 








 Contraloría General de la 
República de Colombia 
 Ley del Banco de la República  
 Ley sobre Establecimientos Bancarios 
 Ley de Timbre (it reorganized the operation 
of Customs and established the Collection 
of National Revenues) 
 Ley de impuesto sobre la renta  
 Ley de Contraloría (Transformed the 
former Court of Accounts into the 
Comptroller General of the Republic).  
 Ley sobre fuerza restrictiva del presupuesto 
(it limited the powers of the Parliament to 
organize public expenditure and left this 
initiative in the hands of the Executive 
Branch).  
 Ley que fijó el número y nomenclaturas de 
los ministerios.  




 Banco Central de Chile 
 Superintendencia de Bancos  
 Contraloría General de la 
República de Chile 
 Ley del Banco Central de Chile  
 Ley General de Bancos  
 Ley Monetaria 
 Ley Orgánica de Presupuesto  





 Banco Central del Ecuador 
 Superintendencia de Bancos del 
Ecuador 
 Contraloría General de la 
República del Ecuador 
 Ley Orgánica del Banco Central del 
Ecuador 
 Ley Orgánica de Bancos  
 Ley Orgánica del Banco Hipotecario  
 Ley de Impuestos Internos.  
 Ley de Monedas  
 Ley sobre los contratos de prenda agrícola  




 Banco Central de Bolivia 
 Superintendencia de Bancos 
 Contraloría General de la 
República de Bolivia 
 Ley de Reorganización del Banco de la 
Nación Boliviana 
 Ley General de Bancos.  
 Ley Monetaria 
Peru 
 (1930) 
 Banco Central de Reserva del 
Perú. 
 Superintendencia de Banca del 
Perú 
 Ley del Banco Central de Reserva del Perú 
 Ley de Bancos del Perú 
 Ley Monetaria 
Source: Gozzi and Tappatá 2010, 2. 
                                                          
3
 According to Santos Molano (2005) the Congress resolved, by a Law of 1922, to create the Bank of the 
Republic and to empower the government to bring a Mission of foreign technicians. 
 
Volume 2, Number 1, 128-173, January-June 2017                  doi: 10.1344/jesb2017.1.j025  
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
146 
The first central banks in Latin America were designed for three objectives: first, to preserve 
the monetary stability; second, to preserve the stability of the banks; finally, to limit the 
public financing (Jácome 2015). The main tool that these objectives had was the emission of a 
currency under the gold standard system: in theory, this would produce low inflation rates 
because it limits the money supply. By 1926, “the gold standard was already established in 
twelve republics from Central and South America” (Thorp 1992, 65). 
The Kemmerer Mission represented the ideals of the U.S. Federal Reserve on how a country 
should manage its finances and what monetary instruments were necessary to use in order to 
obtain a balanced budget while controlling the inflation rates. These ideals were spread in the 
region through the Kemmerer Mission; through the economic branches that were being 
multiplied in the banking system; and also through different U.S. industries and investments, 
the more important were: railroads, mining, and electricity. The creation of the Central Bank 
of Ecuador, and the establishment of the gold standard, as the main monetary policy, was not 
an isolated policy, quite the opposite, was part of a regional trend that was to be broken when 
the Great Depression hit the region.
4
     
The Kemmerer Mission and the Central Bank of Ecuador 
In 1925, the economy of the nation was critical, some bankers from Guayaquil urged 
President Córdova to invite Edwin Kemmerer to advice the government in the foundation of a 
central bank and the stabilization of the fiscal structure, private “bankers thought that the 
services of a distinguished foreign expert were so vital that they offered to pay the cost of an 
                                                          
4
 When the Great Depression started, the Latin American republics decided to leave the gold standard. This 
happened in different years: Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil in 1929; Venezuela in 1930; Mexico, Chile and 
Bolivia in 1931; Colombia, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Peru and Ecuador in 1932.   
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advisory mission if the government had no money” (Rodríguez 1992, 158). The president 
Córdova invited Kemmerer before his government was overthrown.  
Before the arrival of the mission, Luis Napoleón Dillon opposed the advice of a foreigner, this 
position was accepted by the Military Junta. Dillon advised the Military Junta to fund the 
Central Bank of Ecuador using the reserves of the private banks that emitted currency. The 
payment to the private banks for their reserves in gold would have been less than half of the 
value. This proposal was detained because of the public tension from the Coast: the pressure 




 1926, the Military Junta chose the Minister of Social Welfare, Dr. Isidro Ayora, 
as the President of the Republic. In his first decree, Dr. Ayora declared himself as the 
Supreme Commander of the Nation, his appointment was well received by the public: “Dr. 
Ayora has proved that the time in charge of the Ministry, and Chairman of the Municipal 
Council of Quito, are the pearls that adorned his personality” (Coral 1995, 125).  
The new President ordered the closure of several banks and imprisoned the managers arguing 
that they did not obey the order of collecting the illegal checks in circulation. The new 
government appointed Humberto Albornoz as the new Minister of Finances. Albornoz had the 
intention of reopening the Banco Comercial y Agrícola to give tranquility to the markets that 
were anxious because of rumors on other banks being closed. President Ayora rejected 
Albornoz intentions; the most prominent bank from Guayaquil was never reopened.  
In June 1926, the government froze the metallic reserves of the banks that emitted currency, 
and founded the Caja Central de Emisión y Amortización. This institution represented a 
transition stage to the creation of the Central Bank. The reserves in gold from these banks 
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were transferred to the new institution paying less than half of its value in the market: Dillon’s 
advice was followed at last. In total, the reserves transferred to Caja Central de Emisión y 
Amortización amounted 10,604,314.75 sucres (table 3), 35 percent came from Banco 
Comercial y Agrícola. 






Percentage of the 
Total (%) 
Banco del Ecuador Guayaquil 1868 2,572,883.70 24.00 
Banco Comercial y Agrícola Guayaquil 1894 3,716,174.05 35.00 
Banco del Pichincha Quito 1906 2,901,507.00 27.00 
Banco del Azuay Cuenca 1913 737,750.00 0.07 
Banco de Descuento Guayaquil 1920 330,000.00 0.03 
Compañía de Crédito Agrícola 
e Industrial 
Quito 1908 346,000.00 0.03 
Total   10,604,314.75 100 
Source: Author’s creation based on the Executive Decree N. 476, 1926.  
The government of the President Ayora emitted an executive decree regarding the reserves of 
the Banco Comercial y Agrícola that were to be transferred to the Caja Central de Emisión y 
Amortizacón. In the executive decree, published in the official gazette on the 9
th
 of November 
1926, the government settles the amount and the way to pay the bank for its reserves, it is 
written that “the Government may order that any dividends paid continue to be on deposits 
until the purchase by agreement or the immediate withdrawal of circulation of paper money 
according to the amounts paid, all paper money will be incinerated.” This procedure was alike 
with all the banks whose reserves were transferred. In total, few more than 24 million sucres 
were incinerated from 1927 to 1929. 
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Table 4. Incinerated Currency from Private Banks´ Emission, in sucres, 1927-1929 
Comercial y 
Agrícola 
Ecuador Pichincha Azuay Descuento 
Cía. de 
Crédito 
Caja Central Total 
13,534,000 3,283,655 3,038,400 518,300 389,000 305,200 3,066,000 24,134,555 
Source: Banco Central de Ecuador 1929, 26. 
The 18
th
 of October 1926, Edwin Kemmerer in his mission arrived to Ecuador invited by the 
new President of the Republic, Dr. Isidro Ayora. Kemmerer was a well recognized in the 
United States and in several Latin American countries.
5
 In the case of Ecuador, the reforms 
were going to be similar as in other countries, nonetheless, there is no evidence that could 
suggest that Kemmerer was in favor of closing and transferring the reserves of some private 
banks for the creation of the Central Bank of Ecuador. Moreover, there is no evidence that 
could suggest that Kemmerer advised the Ecuadorian government on the way the Central 
Bank had to be founded. That procedure seems to be a local political decision.  
Once the Kemmerer Mission arrived in Ecuador, his fame had spread widely; national 
newspapers published his speeches in Ecuador, Latin America, and the United States. The 
Ecuadorian press published constantly the benefits and results of the Mission in other 
countries of the region,  
it is evident the advantages that came along the creation of the Central Bank in Chile, 
previously authorized by Prof. Dr. Kemmerer. The general conditions of Chile when the 
Central Bank was created were nothing favorable because the country had just emerged from a 
period of two years of revolutionary governments and was going through a period of a real 
crisis. (El Comercio, 1927)  
During its time in Ecuador, the Kemmerer Mission arrived to some conclusions on the fiscal 
structure: 
                                                          
5
 For more information on each country: Guatemala (Molina Calderon 2007); Colombia (Santos Molano 2005); 
Chile (Carrasco 2009); Ecuador (Drake 1995); Bolivia (Administration of Studies and Standards 2007); and Peru 
(Basadre Grohmann 2010) 
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First, small incomes derived from direct taxes, seven percent from the total income. 
Second, great uncertainty on the amount of incomes derived from customs. 
Third, limitations and failures in tax collection. 
Thus, the Mission proposed not to increase the number of taxes but to develop a more 
appropriate tax collection procedure. This was going to be achieved through changes made in 
the Ley Orgánica de Hacienda (Treasury Law). The changes in the tax collection procedure 
increased the government income in almost 40 percent from 1926 to 1928, passing from 44 to 
61 million of current sucres, the biggest increases came from customs and income taxes 
(Almeida 1994, 67).  
Another important contribution from the Mission was the proposal of a law that would 
rearrange the banking system in the country. The banking had few regulations that control the 
behavior of the banks, which emitted currency, but there was a whole in the legislation for the 
rest of the banking. The new law, called Ley General de Bancos, was proposed to fix the lack 
of regulation and guide the loans. This law proposed the division of the banking in three: 
savings; commercial; and mortgage. Moreover, this law would establish the obligation of 
adopting strict accounting procedures and the publishing of the finances of the banks. It 
regulated the proceeding of branch offices, international banks and the duration of the banks 
bestowal (Registro Oficial No. 432, 1927). 
The economic policies of Kemmerer Mission were based on two pillars: the adoption of the 
gold standard and the creation of a central bank. The main purpose of the economic policies 
of the Kemmerer Mission was the monetary and fiscal stability. For that purpose, Dr. 
Kemmerer and his team proposed the creation of three institutions and the adoption of seven 
legal bodies. The Central Bank of Ecuador had four main objectives: emission and conversion 
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of currency; stabilization of international exchange; regularization of discount rates; to help 
banks in times of emergency (Almeida 1994, 84). The bank was managed by a board of eight 
people, the first members were: Neptalí Bonifaz, Federico Malo, Dr. Clemente Ponce, Luis 
Alberto Carbo, Enrique Cueva, Luis Napoleón Dillon, Luis Adriano Dillon, and Agustin 
Rendón.  
Kemmerer left the country in March 1927; in the same month, the government promulgated 
the executive decree to establish of the gold standard. To begin the monetary system under the 
gold standard, the government decided to settle the exchange rate at five sucres for each U.S. 
Dollar.  Moreover, the gold standard, founded in Ecuador, required a gold reserve of 50 
percent of the total deposits and currency in circulation; these reserves could be “in the 
Central Bank facilities or in recognized banks in New York or London” (Morillo 1996, 37). 
After Kemmerer’s departure, the Caja Central de Emisión y Amortización became the Central 
Bank of Ecuador on 10
th
 of August 1927. The Central Bank of Ecuador started with a legal 
reserve of 27,084,667 sucres, which promptly increased to 42,891,098 sucres by the 31
st
 of 
December 1927 (table 5).  The increase of 7,787,756 sucres came from the excessive 
purchases over sales orders from abroad; the increase of 18,675 in coins of gold came through 
the convertibility of banknotes to gold; moreover, the Central Bank of Ecuador bought from 
the government 1,600,000 dollars to a given exchange rate of five sucres per dollar. From the 
total amount of reserves in gold, 10,604,314.75, value in sucres, came from the private banks 
whose reserves were transferred to Caja Central de Emisión y Amortización, that represents 
around 37 percent of total amount in reserves by the 10
th
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Table 5. Central Bank Legal Reserve, 1927 
Legal Reserve Sucres 
On the 10
th
 of August, 1927 27,084,667 
Increase in foreign exchange 7,787,756 
Increase in Gold 18,675 
Purchase of 1,600,000 dollars 8,000,000 
Reserves by the 31
st
 of December, 1927 42,891,098 
Source: Carbo 1978, 150. 
The Ecuadorian case is very similar to others assisted by the Kemmerer Mission in Latin 
America, nonetheless, there is a very important difference: Kemmerer never advised the 
government to close private banks or to use their reserves to open the Central Bank of 
Ecuador. The decisions around the creation of the Caja Central de Emisión y Amortización, 
which was a transitory institution installed until the opening of the Central Bank, was taken 
within a local environment of dispute between the Coast and the Highlands: politicians had 
one specific purpose, to restore the political and economic power in Quito. 
The foundation of the Central Bank of Ecuador in 1927, apart from the foundation of 
institutions of banking and public spending control, is considered the breakpoint to 
modernization. This structuring of the fiscal system of Ecuador remains to this day. At its 
opening, the main function of the Central Bank was to preserve the gold standard through the 
use of two tools, the discount rate and the exchange rate: raising the discount rate if the 
money supply increased, and decreasing the discount rate if the money supply decreased; on 
the other hand, if the exchange rate increased, this would mean an excess of money supply, 
which would force the Central Bank to sell money orders abroad, and doing the opposite if 
the exchange rate decreased.           
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Public finances and the economic situation 
In 1927, Luis Napoleón Dillon published a critic chapter about the economic Ecuadorian 
situation in a book called The economic and financial crisis of Ecuador, which was 
republished by the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Policy of Ecuador in 2013. This 
publication tried to create a scholastic background that would present the Ecuadorian 
economic crisis before the revolution. Most of the book is a recollection of notes written in 
the newspaper El Día with the name “Cases and things Mr. Kemmerer ought to know, a brief 
history of an eleven-year tyranny.” The title of this note had a clear argument: Ecuador was 
living a tyranny before the revolution, and therefore, some kind of intervention was needed.  
The main purpose of this section is to evaluate whether there was an economic critical 
situation. The main arguments revised come from Dillon´s book published in 1925 and re 
edited in 2013, Estrada (1922) and Riofrío (1926), having in mind the advantages of our 
times. The clearest advantage is the economic historical statistics for Latin America, which 
these authors did not have during their lifetime. Therefore, the intention of this part of the 
paper is not to criticize or support such arguments, but to see if there is real evidence around 
the idea, in the public opinion, that Ecuador was living a critical economic situation before the 
revolution. Moreover, it is needed to present data that these authors did not refer to, in order 
to have a more comprehensive context of the years before the creation of the Central Bank of 
Ecuador.  
Before analyzing the most important arguments, it is necessary to understand the historical 
context: The Liberal Revolution in Ecuador started in 1895 when General Eloy Alfaro 
overthrew the government and was declared Commander in Chief. A few years later, some 
rights were proclaimed with the new constitution of 1897, such as the abolition of the death 
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penalty, freedom of worship, the citizenship for every person living in Ecuador, marriage and 
divorce as a civil matter, and the rejection of the influence of the Catholic Church in this civil 
matters. Alfaro was murdered in 1912. From 1913 until 1926, was a known period because,  
The ‘bankocracy’ subordinated the people to the affluent and small group of shareholders who 
handled the few existing banks and that, given the dearth of the state by the crisis in the cocoa 
exports, they provided funds to governments and obviously they passed the bill asserting its 
influence on all decisions. (Lara 2012, 439) 
The plutocratic period (1913-1925) was accused of creating a political context in which the 
influence of private bankers was excessive in the public decision-making. Bankers were 
accused of benefitting from this influence through public debt: private banks were the main 
source to finance the central government. In this sense, Dillon’s first arguments contained 
statements that condemned the fiscal behavior of the governments during the first decades of 
the twenty-century making a clear reference to the government internal debt. 
Public debt 
The main arguments develop the idea that there was an uncontrollable internal public debt. 
The data presented by Dillon (2013), plus additional data on government expenditures, 
government incomes, and the public debt to banks from other sources, have been used to see a 
comprehensive panorama of this statements. From 1913, as shown in table 6 and figure 2, the 
ratio of the internal public debt (IPD) over government expenditures (GE) was always high; 
nonetheless, it increases substantially during the twenties, with the highest pick in 1921, 
registering a radio of 1.3:1. During the twenties, the internal public debt exceeded the total 
amount of public expenditures, which in turn shows a constant fiscal deficit.  
When looking closely at the numbers, it is clear that the internal public debt was high and that 
it increased during the twenties, and even double the amount of previous years, nonetheless, 
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this increment did not come from the public debt to banks. In fact, the ratio of public debt to 
banks (PDB) over the internal public debt (IPD) decreases from 0.66:1 in 1919 to 0.46:1 in 
1924. The increment of the internal debt did not come from the private banking system. 
Moreover, it is ironic to see that the PDB/IPD increases when the military took over the 
government. The increment of internal public debt resulted from the Great War, a period in 
which Ecuador was obliged to acquire debt to finance the military expenditures (Rodríguez 
1994). 
Table 6. Internal public debt, government expenditures and incomes, 1914-1927, millions of 
current sucres 






Public debt to 
banks (PDB) / IPD 
IPD / GE  
1913 14.2 22 20 0.57 0.65 
1914 15.2 23 16 0.65 0.66 
1915 17.1 21 21 0.65 0.82 
1916 18.6 18 18 0.64 1.04 
1917 18.8 18 19 0.66 1.05 
1918 20.7 17 18 0.59 1.22 
1919 22.6 14 18 0.66 1.62 
1920 25.6 23 15 0.60 1.12 
1921 28.5 22 21 0.61 1.30 
1922 32.5 27 25 0.63 1.21 
1923 36 29 25 0.48 1.24 
1924 39.8 35 31 0.46 1.14 
1925 49.3 44 39 0.67 1.12 
1926 42.4 44 65 0.72 0.96 
1927 19.8 70 62 - 0.28 
 
Volume 2, Number 1, 128-173, January-June 2017                  doi: 10.1344/jesb2017.1.j025  
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
156 
Figure 2. PDB / IPD; IPD / GE, 1913-1925, millions of current sucres 
 
Source: Author’s creation. For 1914-1925, data of internal public debt comes from Dillon 2013, 66; for 1913, 
IPD comes from Rodríguez 1992, 143. Data for government expenditures and incomes come from MoxLad 
2016. Data for Public debt to banks comes from Rodríguez 1992, 143.  
It is easy to imagine and accept the statements that portray private banks as having a major 
influence over governmental decisions because of the high public debt that was owed to them. 
Nevertheless, after the Revolución Juliana, after the closure of many private banks, and after 
the foundation of the Central Bank of Ecuador, the percentage of public debt to private banks 
increased year after year, 79.6 percent in 1931, 91.6 percent in 1934 (Rodríguez 1992, 143). 
The fiscal relation to banks did not change in time. 
External trade and government incomes 
The main productive sectors were related to three agricultural products: cocoa, coffee and 
ivory nuts. Cocoa exports represented 60 percent of total exports. Local families from the 
coast were dedicated to exploit the wild cocoa, “[…] a small group of some 20 families 
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properties), Puga (16 properties), Seminary (39 properties), Caamaño (23 properties), Morin 
(28 properties), Duran-Ballén (La Clementina), Burgos (23 properties), Mandinyá (8 
properties) and Sotomayor (4 properties)” (Paz y Miño Cepeda 2011, 54). 
More than 44 percent of government revenues came from customs, becoming the main source 
of public finances. This percentage fluctuated during the twenties, registering some high and 
low picks because of the crisis in the production of cocoa, the main product for exportation. 
As seen in table 7 and figure 3, exports grew continuously during the twenties while the ratio 
of cocoa/total exports reduced uninterruptedly.  
The importance of cocoa exportations was decreasing because of two main reasons. First, the 
plagues that cocoa plantation suffered, there were two major diseases that attacked cocoa 
plantations, the first is known as witches' broom, and the second known as Monilia fungus, 
both caused the tree to quickly dry in seven-ten days. Second, the First World War affected 
the commercial relations between Ecuador and the European market. There were some plans 
to recover the plantations, which worked partially; however, cocoa exports never recovered 
the production and the level of exports (60 percent of total exports) registered during the first 
decade of the twenty-century.   
While the ratio of cocoa/total exports was decreasing, other products, among which the main 
one was oil, were replacing cocoa. Oil exports represented less than five percent of total 
exports during the first decade of the twenty-century, however, its importance increased 
rapidly during the second decade, registering 19.6 percent of total exports in 1930 (Naranjo 
2016, 76). Another export product that increased its importance was coffee. Coffee exports 
represented 1.8 percent of total products in 1920, whereas in 1926 it represented 18.1 percent 
of total exports (Rodríguez 1992, 214).  
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Table 7. Trade Balance in Ecuador, millions of current sucres 












1913 32.4 100.0 18.1 100.0 14.3 20.5 0.63 
1914 26.8 82.7 17.2 95.0 9.5 20.7 0.77 
1915 26.5 81.8 17.3 95.6 9.2 19.9 0.75 
1916 36.1 111.4 19.1 105.5 16.9 26.2 0.73 
1917 32.8 101.2 20.9 115.5 11.9 21.9 0.67 
1918 27.1 83.6 16.6 91.7 10.4 17.1 0.63 
1919 42.7 131.8 24.0 132.6 18.7 29.4 0.69 
1920 48.8 150.6 43.4 239.8 5.3 35.5 0.73 
1921 32.7 100.9 23.4 129.3 9.2 20.3 0.62 
1922 44.7 138.0 33.5 185.1 11.1 30.2 0.68 
1923 36.8 113.6 36.8 203.3 0.02 18.8 0.51 
1924 59.2 182.7 52.0 287.3 7.2 30.2 0.51 
1925 69.6 214.8 55.2 305.0 14.4 33.9 0.49 
1926 60.2 185.8 47.0 259.7 13.2 26.4 0.44 
1927 74.8 230.9 57.0 314.9 17.7 36.9 0.49 
Source: Author’s creation. Data for exports and imports come from Banco Central del Ecuador 1940, 17. Data 
for cocoa exportations come from Rodriguez 1992, 223.  
The trade balance of Ecuador fluctuated (table 7), from 1913 to 1927, dramatically, drawing 
constantly high and low peaks. In millions of sucres, the high peaks are visible in 1916 (16.9), 
1919 (18.7), and 1927 (17.7), while the low peaks occurred in 1920 (5.3), and 1923 (0.02). In 
US dollars, the fluctuation of the trade balance is similar to the one registered in sucres. 
Nonetheless, the apparent recovery of the trade in sucres in 1927 does not have the same 
impact in US dollars: from 1926 to 1927, in millions of sucres, the balance trade moved from 
13.2 to 17.7, while, in million US Dollars, it moved from 2.5 to 3.5, this data shows that, even 
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though in nominal prices, the trade improved in one year, the exchange rate diminished the 
significance of the improvement. These fluctuations in the trade balance are related to the fact 
that Ecuadorian main product of exportation, cocoa, reduced its production because of the 
attack of diseases in the plantations. Furthermore, from 1913 to 1927, in million US dollars, 
the trade balance reduced in almost half, from 6.6 to 3.5: a real catastrophe for external trade. 
Figure 3. Exports index, cocoa export/ total exports, Ecuador, 1923/1927 
 
Source: Author’s creation. Data for exports and imports come from Banco Central del Ecuador 1940, 17. Data 
for cocoa exportations come from Rodriguez 1992, 223. Secondary axis for Cocoa/ total exports.  
Money supply, inflation, and exchange rates 
Around the idea of crisis, another argument used was the inorganic currency supply. Before 
the creation of the Central Bank of Ecuador (1927), the emission of currency was in the hands 
of private banks, which decided the emission of currency given their own judgment, “the 
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not mention any time period, it might be from 1917 to 1927. This statement involves the 
increment of the inflation and, therefore, the decreasing of the purchasing power. 
As shown in table 8, money supply increased from 1922 to 1925 in 76 percent (current 
prices), which would raise the inflation rates. The Great War left the region with a major 
devaluation of local currencies (table 10) that obliged governments to increase the monetary 
supply. The case of Ecuador is not separated from the region, yet, its devaluation and inflation 
was higher than the average of the region. It is important to notice that until 1919 the 
exchange rate of the region fluctuated with no major changes, but, after World War I, 
devaluation was a common symptom. The restriction of the monetary supply in Ecuador in 
1922 was a policy to try to control the inflation rates that were raising because of the 
devaluation of the currency.  
Table 8. Money supply, Ecuador, 1920-1927 





1920 9,324,322.00 22,455,896.00 13,711,835.00 36,167,731.00 36,167,731.00 
1922 8,346,240.90 16,671,484.40 13,697,009.30 30,368,493.70 34,738,519.94 
1923 7,688,158.60 24,328,490.20 14,420,577.00 38,749,067.30 48,482,833.01 
1925 6,669,754.50 25,412,894.00 15,801,331.40 41,214,225.50 60,609,640.02 
1927 
 
22,525,412.70 11,193,707.20 34,125,950,2 58,573,780.92 
Source: Author’s creation. Data for money supply in constant prices comes from: Marchán 2013, 285. The index 
price published by Marchán (2013) has been used to transform the data into current prices. Money supply is the 
sum of currency in circulation and deposits. 
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Table 9. Price index, Ecuador and Latin America, 1913-1927 
Year Ecuador Colombia Venezuela Peru Latin America 
1913 100 100 100 100 100 
1914 100 67 100 100 92 
1915 130 67 105 100 101 
1916 170 67 114 100 113 
1917 204 67 130 133 133 
1918 238 67 135 133 143 
1919 214 133 157 167 168 
1920 192 133 178 167 168 
1921 194 100 135 167 149 
1922 215 100 124 167 151 
1923 208 100 124 167 150 
1924 242 133 130 167 168 
1925 245 167 135 167 178 
1926 309 167 141 167 196 
1927 300 167 135 167 192 
 
Figure 4. Price index, Ecuador and Latin America, 1913-1927 
 
Source: Author’s creation. Data for Ecuador comes from Drake 1984, 220; for the rest of countries, MoxLad 
2016. Data for Latin America base year is 1970=100; the base has been changed to 1913. Logarithmic trend 
lines.  
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Table 10. Exchange rate, Ecuador and Latin America, 1913-1927 (LCU/US $) 
Year Ecuador Brazil Bolivia Chile Peru Venezuela Latin America 
1913 2.09 3 3 
 
2 5 3.02 
1914 2.11 3 3 7 2 5 3.69 
1915 2.15 4 3 6 2 5 3.69 
1916 2.23 4 3 4 2 5 3.37 
1917 2.48 4 3 4 2 5 3.41 
1918 2.57 4 2 3 2 4 2.93 
1919 2.14 4 3 4 2 5 3.36 
1920 2.25 4 3 5 2 6 3.71 
1921 3.46 8 4 8 3 6 5.41 
1922 4.27 8 4 8 3 5 5.38 
1923 4.79 10 3 8 2 5 5.47 
1924 5.03 9 3 9 2 5 5.51 
1925 4.32 8 3 9 2 5 5.22 
1926 5.12 7 3 8 3 5 5.19 
1927 5.01 8 3 8 3 5 5.34 
 
Figure 5. Exchange rate, Ecuador and Latin America, 1913-1927, 1913=100 
 
Source: Author’s creation. Data for Ecuador comes from Dirección Nacional de Estadística 1944, 373; for Latin 
America, MoxLad 2016.  
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The argument on the increasing cost of living is supported by the statistics presented in this 
section. The inflation rates of Ecuador show a general tendency to escalate until 1926, with 
two picks, in 1918 and 1926. This phenomenon is the product of the devaluation of the 
currency and the increment of money supply that came from private banking, responsible of 
the emission of currency. Ecuador is not a single case in the region, on the contrary, the 
region shows a similar pattern: an escalating inflation and currency devaluation.  
Gross Domestic Product 
Regarding the evolution of the Gross Domestic Product, from 1914 to 1927, there is a 
constant increase of an annual average of 3.9 percent, which is the media of the region for the 
same period. There is no year with a negative growth. Latin America shows a decreasing 
GDP in 1914 due to the beginning of the Great War, “in a very short time the entire banking 
and credit system and the organization of money markets were suspended, which in Latin 
America caused an acute liquidity crisis and financial panic in 1913-1914” (Bethell 1991, 53-
54). 
The falling of Great Britain as the international hegemon gave space for United States to 
become the first commercial partner in Latin America. From 1914, United States was the 
destiny of more than 40 percent of the total exports of the region. There was also an 
increasing foreign investment in strategic sectors as: mining in Mexico, railways in Ecuador, 
copper in Peru, bananas in Colombia and sugar in Cuba, “private investment of the United 
States abroad increased from 3500 million in 1915 to 6400 million in 1919” (Lewis 1938, 
449).  
After the Great War, the U.S. established a strong presence in the region through foreign 
investments and commerce. This increasing influence came along with the idea of a reduced 
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role of the government and free market. Bethell (1991) affirms that the foreign investment in 
the region increased, from 1919 to 1928 in around 30 percent, which shows that the American 
presence, and its model of growing, was spread in most part of Latin America. The economic 
growth of the region was based on the exports until 1929, when the Great Depression 
collapsed the model and gave birth to a period of protectionism and industrialization.    
Table 11. Gross Domestic Product, 1970=100, in millions of local currencies 
Years Argentina Brazil Ecuador Venezuela Peru Colombia Uruguay 
Latin 
America 
1913 14048 11689 2402 1416 18912 8239 142250 28422.3 
1914 12587 11434 2507 1229 18797 8552 118517 24803.3 
1915 12657 11946 2621 1259 20417 8947 112383 24318.6 
1916 12292 12295 2714 1179 22533 9408 116217 25234.0 
1917 11294 13145 2808 1367 23365 9794 128193 27138.0 
1918 13373 12878 2908 1349 23505 10338 135861 28601.7 
1919 13865 14577 3040 1252 24286 11197 153496 31673.3 
1920 14877 16015 3177 1493 24529 11962 133852 29415.0 
1921 15256 16349 3291 1543 25544 12651 140826 30780.0 
1922 16464 17476 3407 1576 27745 13507 161054 34461.3 
1923 18290 18479 3526 1806 29656 14369 169561 36526.7 
1924 19709 18467 3650 2077 32449 15186 185809 39621.0 
1925 19625 18541 3779 2666 33307 16005 178543 38923.7 
1926 20566 18938 3900 3203 36689 17533 194900 42247.0 
1927 22027 20313 4104 3569 37337 19112 222941 47057.6 
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Figure 6. Real GDP, Latin America, 1913-1927, 1913=100 
 
Source: MoxLad 2016. Figures are estimated with rate of growth of GDP $PPP 1990 from Bértola and Ocampo 
2010. 
The case of Ecuador represents the mean of the region, the constant increase of the Gross 
Domestic Product shows that the economy was growing in a slow pace, with no substantial 
benefits. The evolution of GDP can be used to affirm that there was no contraction in the 
economy: Ecuadorian economy is not an outlier in the region, on the contrary, it represents 
the economic development of the region. 
Even though there was a real crisis in the governmental finances, and there was an increasing 
cost of living, the economy of Ecuador was growing at the same pace of the region. On the 
other hand, the local economic problems presented in the inflation rates were not present in 
the majority of the population because one third of the population lived in rural areas and the 
majority of this section lived in a barter system (Naranjo 2016), the economic problems were 
present in the urban cities. The crisis was felt mainly in the urban centers of Quito and 
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main exporting companies, which commercialized cocoa, coffee, and ivory nuts; while Quito 
was the center of the textile industries, whose production was consumed internally.  
Notes on social conflicts in Ecuador 
The sectors that felt the increasing cost of living, influenced by Russian Revolution, 
organized strikes in the main cities, especially in Guayaquil and Quito. Luna Tamayo (2013), 
citing Albornoz (1969), records some of the most important conflicts. As shown in table 12, 
the majority of the conflicts were registered in Quito and Guayaquil, most of the strikes were 
generated because of wages increase. Luna Tamayo (2013, 37) argues that there is an 
increasing tendency of workers’ strikes, the majority of these strikes pursued some objectives: 
“[…] salary increase, employment, labor stability and better working conditions.”  
The most important event occurred on the 15
th
 of November 1922, when workers organized 
themselves and decreed in Guayaquil the first major general strike. Workers in Guayaquil 
could not remain in peace,  
After the city lived a week without street lighting, due to cuts in the electric power, and 
without food supplies, thousands of workers began to march through the streets demanding 
immediate solutions to their problems and the high cost of living, paralyzing completely the 
commercial, industrial, social and economic activity of Guayaquil (Avilés Pino 2016) 
The 15
th
 of November, hundreds of workers walked through the main streets of the city to 
gathered at Plaza del Centenario. After some fiery harangues, many protesters attacked the 
police, others tried to rob the warehouses located on the main street of the city, the Av. 9 de 
Octubre. After some hours of violence, with the help of the military, the police could regain 
the control of the city with a heavy toll of deaths.  
Avilés Pino (2016) states that the general strike in Guayaquil had been interpreted by some 
leftist authors as the cornerstone of the social claims of the twenties. Avilés Pino considers 
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that these writers, such as Joaquín Gallegos Lara (1946) and Óscar Enfrén Reyes (1949), 
created myths around the events on the 15
th
 of November 1922. The most famous myth tells 
the story that the corpses of the workers were thrown to the Guayas river to disappear any 
evidence of the massacre. The social claims, evident in the strikes of the twenties, gave birth 
to the Revolución Juliana.     
Table 12. Workers strikes and social claims 1914 -1929 
Year Type of workers Place Motive/actions 
1914 Railway workers 
Bahía de 
Caráques- Chone 
Payment of wages 
1916 Workers Sugar mill Valdez 
Rising  of wages and decreasing of 
working hours 
1916 Cocoa workers Guayaquil Rising of wages 
1916 Wagon and urban car drivers Guayaquil 
Rising of salaries and compliance of 
Working hours 
1916 Railway workers Durán  
1918 Barbers Guayaquil Rising of wages 
1918 Tailors Quito Rising of wages 
1919 Typographers Quito Rising of wages 
1919 Miners Portovelo Rising of wages 
1919 Tailors Riobamba Rising of salaries 
1919 Pharmacy employees Guayaquil Rising of salaries 




Resistance to territorial taxes 
1922 General strike of workers Guayaquil 
Rising of salaries, labor stability, against 
the critical economic conditions 
1923 Hacienda Leyto Baños Indigenous uprising 
1923 
Workers of the cigar factory La 
Corona 
Guayaquil Rising of salaries 
1924 Rubber tappers Amazon region 
Forty rubber tappers died at the hands of 
Shuar warriors 
1924 Native Indigenous Sicalpa Indigenous uprising 
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Year Type of workers Place Motive/actions 
1924 Shuar Warriors Amazon region 
Shuar warriors attack the camp of 
Salesian missionaries 
1924 Communards Illinsichi Communards are faced with the army 
1924 Sawmill workers Esmeraldas 100 workers were fired 
1924 Operators of the cotton industry Ambato Rising of salaries 
1924 Police officers Quito 
Insurgency of officers from Esmeraldas 
in police headquarters 
1928 Native Indigenous San José de Minas Indigenous uprising 




1928 Native Indigenous Tisaleo Armed uprising of 3,000 indigenous 
1929 Bank employees Guayaquil Reject retirement tax 
1929 Native Indigenous Colta 
Six thousand Indigenous take control of 
the haciendas 
Source: Authors creation. Data come from: Luna 2013, 36-37, 42-43; Avilés Pino 2016.  
These examples show that the main economic concern in urban cities were the rise of salaries. 
This was a real economic issue, as shown previously. Nonetheless, as it was mentioned, the 
economic problems were not present in the majority of the population, which lived in rural 
areas and lived under their own conditions: country people were consumers of products that 
were harvested by themselves. 
Final remarks 
This article started with some enquiries, the first one regarding the arguments behind the two 
main readings of the Revolución Juliana: are they complementary or are they opposed to each 
other? The two readings of this event raise a broader debate about how some historical events 
in Ecuador have been written: is it possible to settle a line that divides the writers’ political 
ideologies with the actual facts? How much of what has been written has to be doubted or 
expanded?  
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Having in consideration that the first reading of the Revolution Juliana emphasizes the 
patriotic feelings of the military officers, while the second reading emphasizes the personal 
motivation of Luis Napoleón Dillon, it can be affirmed that both readings are complementary. 
In fact, this article proposes a short version that joins both perspectives: the young military 
officers had genuine motives as they were young and idealist, but it is also difficult to deny 
the personal motivation of Dillon, which were intertwined with some regional antagonism 
between the Coast and the Highlands.  
The second question refers to the arguments that affirm that Ecuador was living within a 
critical economic situation. On the one hand, from 1913 to 1927, the Ecuadorian economy 
grew at a rate of 3.9 percent. On the other hand, the inflation in Ecuador was the highest in the 
region: the constant increasing of the cost of living was enough to create a social environment 
of a critical economic situation.  Furthermore, the public finances were unbalanced due to 
public debt, which increased constantly during the twenties. Nonetheless, this increase did not 
come from the public debt to banks, but it was the result of the Great War, a period in which 
Ecuador was obliged to acquire debt to finance the military expenditures. 
Was Ecuador living within a critical economic situation? The fluctuation in prices had 
diminished the purchasing power in urban areas, which, in turn, created an increasing social 
perception of a critical economic situation. This perception was more notorious in the 
industries related to the exports of cocoa: the plantation diseases affected greatly the 
production of cocoa, which represented 60 percent of total exports. However, the economic 
crisis was not an important element in rural areas, where people lived in a barter system. 
People in rural areas represented one third of the total population.  
 
Volume 2, Number 1, 128-173, January-June 2017                  doi: 10.1344/jesb2017.1.j025  
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
170 
Was Ecuadorian economy an isolated case or was part of a trend in the region? Ecuador was 
not an isolated case in Latin America, in fact, the region was going through the same issues: 
increasing public expenditure due to the effects of the Great War; increasing cost of living; 
increasing American investment; and, a slow economic growth reflected in the evolution of 
the GDP.   
Finally, it could be argued that the Kemmerer Mission was an essential tool to spread the 
influence of the United States in Latin America. However, the Mission did not visit countries 
to impose policies or the foundation of institutions, rather the Mission visited each country 
after the invitation of the local government. In this sense, it is important to consider that E.W. 
Kemmerer never advised the Ecuadorian government to close private banks or to use their 
reserves to open the Central Bank of Ecuador. This decision was taken by local politicians, 
and it happened before the Mission’s arrival. 
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